Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5060738 | Economics Letters | 2011 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
We show that a multiple-unit descending-price auction in which the clock is not reset after each sale may be faster and yield more stable prices than an efficient alternative, thus providing sellers a rationale for using it in practice.
⺠We analyze a multiple-unit descending-price auction in which the clock is not reset after each sale. ⺠This is not efficient and yields smaller revenue to sellers than the standard efficient mechanism. ⺠We use numerical methods to compute average prices and revenue for a family of distribution functions. ⺠We show that the single-run auction is faster and less volatile in prices. ⺠This explains why impatient or risk averse sellers may prefer this method as observed in real-markets.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Irene MartÃnez-Pardina, Andrés Romeu,