| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5060834 | Economics Letters | 2011 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
⺠We study a three-stage all-pay auction with two players in which the first player to win two matches wins the best-of-three all-pay auction. ⺠The players have values of winning the contest as well as values of losing, the latter depending on the stage in which the contest is decided. ⺠It is shown that without values of losing, if players are heterogeneous the best-of-three all-pay auction is less productive than the one-stage all-pay auction. ⺠However, the best-of-three all-pay auction with different values of losing over the contest's stages may be more productive than the one-stage all-pay auction.
Keywords
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Aner Sela,