| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5060865 | Economics Letters | 2011 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
⺠We elicit probabilistic beliefs from experienced observers about choices in a 2x2 asymmetric matching pennies game. ⺠Observers are either paid based on a quadratic scoring rule or just the same flat fee per round in the treatments. ⺠Beliefs are elicited a second time in each round where subjects can revise their forecasts after observing the beliefs of all other members of their group. ⺠The lack of incentives for accurate beliefs has a substantial negative impact on the accuracy of initial as well as updated individual and group mean beliefs.
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Authors
Stephanie W. Wang,