| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5060997 | Economics Letters | 2011 | 4 Pages |
Abstract
We model competition between two firms in an upstream-downstream relationship. Each firm can pay a sunk cost to enter the other's market. We show that coordination (e.g., through merger) can be anticompetitive, and that such coordination can arise in equilibrium.
Research HighlightsâºVertical mergers can be anticompetitive when each firm can enter the other's market. âºEach firm can be uniquely positioned to compete in the other's market. âºEntrants need not be efficient to generate these anticompetitive mergers.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Juan S. Lleras, Nathan H. Miller,