Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5066418 | European Economic Review | 2016 | 14 Pages |
Abstract
We show that choices in competitive behavior may entail a gender wage gap. In our experiments, employees first choose a remuneration scheme (competitive tournament vs. piece rate) and then conduct a real-effort task. Employers know the pie size the employee has generated, the remuneration scheme chosen, and the employee׳s gender. Employers then decide how the pie will be split, as in a dictator game. Whereas employers do not discriminate by gender when tournaments are chosen, they take substantially and significantly more from female employees who choose piece-rate remuneration. A discriminatory wage gap occurs which cannot be attributed to employees׳ performance.
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Authors
Matthias Heinz, Hans-Theo Normann, Holger A. Rau,