Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
5066748 European Economic Review 2014 18 Pages PDF
Abstract

•Political budget cycles are larger when political parties are younger.•PBCs are predicted to be smaller when voters are informed, politicians are credible.•Older parties are more likely to be organized to increase information and credibility.•Other political characteristics of countries do not account for the effects of party age.•On the contrary, party age explains why PBCs are larger in young democracies.

We identify a new explanation for political budget cycles (PBCs): politicians have stronger incentives to increase spending around elections in the presence of younger political parties. Previous research suggests that PBCs should be larger when voters are uninformed about politician characteristics and politicians are less credible. Research on political parties suggests that older parties are more likely to attenuate problems of both information and credible commitment. The effects of party age are robust to controls for numerous other political characteristics of countries. In particular, the arguments and evidence here illuminate a mechanism underlying recent robust findings that PBCs are larger in younger democracies: party age fully accounts for these effects.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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