Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067075 | European Economic Review | 2012 | 19 Pages |
We construct a model where an entrepreneur can innovate for entry or for sale. It is shown that increased product market competition tends to increase the relative profitability of innovation for sale. Increased competition not only reduces the profits of entrants and the acquirer of the inventions in a similar fashion, but also reduces the profit of non-acquirers. Therefore, incumbents' valuations of innovations are less negatively affected by increased competition, and the incentive for innovation for sale can increase with increased competition. Moreover, a stricter, but not too strict, merger policy is shown to increase the incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring the bidding competition for the innovation.
⺠Constructed a model where an entrepreneur can innovate for entry or for sale. ⺠Increased competition increases the profitability of innovation for sale relative to for entry. ⺠Stricter merger policy increases incentive for innovations for sale by ensuring bidding competition. ⺠Incentive for innovation for sale can increase in competition when firms' profits decrease in competition.