Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067094 | European Economic Review | 2011 | 16 Pages |
Abstract
We consider a job matching model where the relationships between firms and wealth-constrained workers suffer from moral hazard. Specifically, effort on the job is non-contractible so that parties that are matched negotiate a bonus contract. Higher unemployment benefits affect the workers' outside option. The latter is improved for low-skilled workers. Hence they receive a larger share of the surplus, which strengthens their effort incentives and increases productivity. Effects are reversed for high-skilled workers. Moreover, raising benefit payments affects the proportion of successful matches, which induces some firms to exit the economy and causes unemployment to increase.
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Authors
Dominique Demougin, Carsten Helm,