Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067683 | European Economic Review | 2006 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
We investigate a mixed market where a welfare-maximizing public research institute competes against profit-maximizing private firms. We investigate R&D competition by using a standard model of patent races where each firm chooses both its innovation size and R&D expenditure. We find that the innovation size (R&D expenditure) chosen by the public institute is too small (too large) from the viewpoint of social welfare, respectively, and so the government should control the public institute appropriately. We also discuss the welfare implications of privatization of public research institutes.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Ikuo Ishibashi, Toshihiro Matsumura,