Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
5067860 European Journal of Political Economy 2016 18 Pages PDF
Abstract

•Examines the local electoral consequences of a national reform•Uses the case of the reform of the school week in France•Shows that voters put the blame on local politicians•Although some deciders expected the consequences•And decided to boycott the reform.

This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school week in France provides the ground for a verification of the attribution of accountability hypothesis, as it was nationally decided and locally implemented, right before a municipal election. The results confirm that local incumbents have taken the blame of the reform, especially in larger cities. In this case, thus, the cost of the reform is borne twice by the lower level of government, financially and politically. So doing, the central government does a dirty deed to the local ones, for a very cheap cost. That mayors who have announced a boycott of the reform have received electoral gains confirms that some local politicians expected to be the fall guys, bearing the brunt of the costs of the reform.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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