Inefficient predation and political transitions

•Political economic analysis of inefficient predation by autocratic regimes.•Informational shocks can unexpectedly spark democratic revolutionary movements.•Revolution over institutional, rather than distributional, grievances.•Social learning processes may allow for revolutionary waves.•Economic liberalization and growth required for democratic consolidation.

This paper presents a theory of endogenous economic institutions in non-democracies, where political accountability is enforced through the threat of revolution. We consider a dynamic game between an elite ruling class and a disenfranchised working class, in which workers have imperfect information about the economy's productive possibilities. We characterize the conditions under which (i) the elite implement an inefficient rent-creating economic institution at the risk of provoking a revolution based on institutional grievances, (ii) information shocks can catalyze revolutionary movements that may be contagious among similar countries, and (iii) democratic transitions can be consolidated following revolutionary liberalizations.