Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5067988 | European Journal of Political Economy | 2014 | 6 Pages |
â¢Corruption in public procurement is a major problem.â¢Scoring auction is often used to award contracts in public procurement.â¢A corrupt political representative chooses the rules of the scoring auction.â¢Such corruption always leads to lower quality and lower price.â¢Higher bargaining power of the politician leads to higher price.
In this paper we theoretically analyse effects of corruption in public procurements within a scoring-auction framework. A corrupt politician, who acts on behalf of the public sector, receives a kickback from the winning bidder. The politician selects the scoring rule. The paper shows that such corruption always leads to lower quality and lower price. Given a level of corruption, a higher bargaining power of the politician in extracting bribes does not affect the quality but leads to higher price.