Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5068266 | European Journal of Political Economy | 2011 | 7 Pages |
An autocratic ruler seeking a successor who will recognize and maintain his legacy faces a dilemma. The designated successor may become too successful politically and threaten the autocrat's rule, or if not successful in achieving recognition, the designated successor may fail to remain in office after the ruler dies, and the ruler's legacy will not be sustained. The dilemma is also that of the successor in choosing self-promotion that threatens the still-living ruler. I examine the solution to the successor's dilemma in the single-party system China. Uniquely for an autocracy, China has term limits and also age limits on political office. I describe how term limits and dual-generation designation of successors on the basis of “checks-and-balances” were the consequence of a rational choice of Deng Xiaoping, as a paramount leader, to resolve the successor's dilemma so as to extend his own power to sustain his legacies.
Research highlights⺠(POLECO 1239) The successor's dilemma in China's single party political system. ⺠The successor's dilemma is hard to avoid in autocracies. ⺠I examine the solutions to this dilemma in China's single-party political system. ⺠Deng Xiaoping initiated term limits and dual-generation designation of successors. ⺠These institutional changes are Deng's rational choice to extend legacy of greatness.