Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5069698 | Finance Research Letters | 2012 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
Using a dynamic real options approach we show that managerial flexibility is strengthening the first-mover advantage in bargaining M&As by undermining the bargaining power of the second mover.
⺠We model a sequential bargaining game of an M&A by means of real options. ⺠We show that in general a first-mover advantage prevails. ⺠Increasing interest rates will reduce the first-mover advantage. ⺠Managerial flexibility is undermining the bargaining power of the second mover. ⺠Therefore, the first-mover advantage is reinforced by managerial flexibility.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Elmar Lukas, Andreas Welling,