Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
5071270 Games and Economic Behavior 2017 13 Pages PDF
Abstract

•We analyze costly voting with multiple candidates under plurality rule.•In equilibrium, all “relevant” candidates have an equal chance of winning.•All voters who cast votes do so for their most preferred candidate.

We analyze a costly voting model with multiple candidates under plurality rule. In equilibrium, the set of candidates is partitioned into a set of “relevant candidates” (which contains at least two candidates) and the remaining candidates. All relevant candidates receive votes and have an equal chance of winning, independent of their popular support levels. The remaining candidates do not receive any votes. Furthermore, all voters who cast votes do so for their most preferred candidate, i.e., there is no “strategic voting.”

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Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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