Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071281 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2017 | 13 Pages |
Abstract
We consider the problem of distributing the proceeds generated from a joint venture in which the participating agents are hierarchically organized. We introduce and characterize a family of allocation rules where revenue 'bubbles up' in the hierarchy. The family is flexible enough to accommodate the no-transfer rule (where no revenue bubbles up) and the full-transfer rule (where all the revenues bubble up to the top of the hierarchy). Intermediate rules within the family are reminiscent of popular incentive mechanisms for social mobilization or multi-level marketing.
Related Topics
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Jens Leth Hougaard, Juan D. Moreno-Ternero, Mich Tvede, Lars Peter Ãsterdal,