Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071346 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2017 | 37 Pages |
Abstract
Simple majority does not reflect the intensity of voters' preferences. This paper presents an efficient collective choice mechanism with two alternatives when the designer may use non-transferable punishments to persuade agents to reveal their private information. The designer faces a dilemma - a punishment may induce a more correct choice, but its cost is socially wasteful. The efficient mechanism is a weighted majority. Weight of each individual is known ex ante and no punishments are applied if preferences are relatively homogeneous. Eliciting types through punishments in order to construct type-specific weights should occur if preference intensity is relatively heterogeneous.
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Authors
Maksymilian Kwiek,