Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071408 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2017 | 18 Pages |
Abstract
We consider auctions with entry based on a general analytical framework we call the Arbitrarily Selective (AS) model. We characterize symmetric equilibrium in a broad class of standard auctions within this framework, in the process extending the classic revenue equivalence results of Myerson (1981), Riley and Samuelson (1981) and Levin and Smith (1994) to environments with endogenous and arbitrarily selective entry. We also explore the relationship between revenue maximization and efficiency, showing that a revenue maximizing seller will typically employ both higher-than-efficient reservation prices and higher-than-efficient entry fees.
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Authors
Matthew Gentry, Tong Li, Jingfeng Lu,