Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071423 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2017 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
Austen-Smith and Banks (1996) showed that sincere/informative voting is not typically an equilibrium of the Condorcet voting model when the size of the electorate is large. Here, we reverse their finding by adding a third type of voter-one that receives no information in favor of either of the alternatives-as well as global uncertainty about the probability that each voter is such a “no evidence type.” The expected number of no evidence type voters can be arbitrarily small; nevertheless, if the electorate is large enough, then each of the two standard Condorcet types votes sincerely in every nondegenerate type-symmetric equilibrium.
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Authors
Avidit Acharya, Adam Meirowitz,