Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071695 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2014 | 24 Pages |
Abstract
The extensive form game we study has multiple perfect equilibria, but it has a unique limiting logit equilibrium (QRE) and a unique level-k prediction as k approaches infinity. The convergence paths of QRE and level-k are different, but they converge to the same limit point. We analyze whether subjects adapt beliefs when gaining experience, and if so whether they take the QRE or the level-k learning path. We estimate transitions between level-k and QRE belief rules using Markov-switching rule learning models. The analysis reveals that subjects take the level-k learning path and that they advance gradually, switching from level 1 to 2, from level 2 to equilibrium, and reverting to level 1 after observing opponents deviating from equilibrium. The steady state therefore contains a mixture of behavioral rules: levels 0, 1, 2, and equilibrium with weights of 2.9%, 16.6%, 37.9%, and 42.6%, respectively.
Keywords
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Authors
Yves Breitmoser, Jonathan H.W. Tan, Daniel John Zizzo,