| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5071771 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2013 | 23 Pages |
Abstract
We investigate a private value auction in which a single “entrant” on winning imposes a negative externality on two “regular” bidders. In an English auction when all bidders are active, “regular” bidders free ride, exiting before price reaches their values. In a first-price sealed-bid auction incentives for free riding and aggressive bidding coexist, limiting free riding compared to the English auction. We find substantial, though incomplete, free riding in the clock auction. In first-price auctions, regular bidders bid more aggressively than the “entrant” and both bid higher than in auctions with no externality. Predictions regarding revenue, efficiency, and successful entry between the two auctions are satisfied.
Related Topics
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Authors
Youxin Hu, John Kagel, Xiaoshu Xu, Lixin Ye,