| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5071883 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2014 | 9 Pages |
Abstract
â¢A seller is selling a good to two potential buyers.â¢Each buyer is asked a binary question about their valuation in one of finitely many periods.â¢We characterize welfare maximizing protocols.â¢In a welfare maximizing protocol, the seller questions one buyer in all the periods but the last.
We examine a model of limited communication in which the seller is selling a single good to two potential buyers. In each of the finite number of periods the seller asks one of the two buyers a binary question. After the final answer, the allocation and the transfers are executed. The model sheds light on the communication protocols that arise in welfare maximizing mechanisms.
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Authors
Nenad Kos,