Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071943 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2013 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
In a credence goods game with an expert and a consumer, we study experimentally the impact of two devices that are predicted to induce consumer-friendly behavior if the expert has a propensity to feel guilty when he believes that he violates the consumerʼs payoff expectations: (i) an opportunity for the expert to make a non-binding promise; and (ii) an opportunity for the consumer to burn money. In belief-based guilt aversion theory the first opportunity shapes an expertʼs behavior if an appropriate promise is made and if it is expected to be believed by the consumer; by contrast, the second opportunity might change behavior even though this option is never used along the predicted path. Experimental results confirm the behavioral relevance of (i) but fail to confirm (ii).
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Authors
Adrian Beck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, Jianying Qiu, Matthias Sutter,