Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5071958 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2013 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
⺠We model the optimization problem of a campaign trying to win an election when agentsʼ voting probabilities are uncertain. ⺠With a small amount of uncertainty and a large electorate, many counterintuitive results that accompany certain voting probabilities disappear. ⺠For fractions of voters, a campaign should maximize the difference between its share and its opponentʼs share of the vote. ⺠When a campaign can target only finitely many voters, maximization of the expected share of the vote remains optimal. ⺠For finite policies, a required convergence condition that normally does not obtain is necessarily satisfied when voting probabilities are uncertain.
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Authors
Michael Mandler,