| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5072035 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2012 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
⺠In a nonrenewable resource market, the open-loop cartel-fringe equilibrium outcome is supported as an outcome of a subgame-perfect equilibrium. ⺠Equilibrium outcomes of the closed-loop Nash and cartel-fringe games differ even when the number of fringe firms is infinite. ⺠Price taking by the fringe is not the outcome of a limit case of an asymmetric closed-loop Cournot oligopoly. ⺠The cartel-fringe model cannot be interpreted as a limit case of an asymmetric closed-loop Cournot oligopoly.
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Authors
Hassan Benchekroun, Cees Withagen,