| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5072057 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2012 | 15 Pages |
Abstract
⺠The paper constructs a specific equilibrium in Sender-Receiver games with transmission of information through binary noisy channels. ⺠The Sender uses the block-coding rule as her signaling strategy. ⺠The Receiverʼs best response partitions the space of signals by the Hamming distances between received messages and equilibrium messages. ⺠The Senderʼs block-coding rule is an equilibrium strategy. The tie-breaking decoding is crucial for the equilibrium existence. ⺠Efficiency is analyzed by comparing ex-ante equilibrium payoffs with those of noiseless communication.
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Authors
Penélope Hernández, Amparo Urbano, José E. Vila,