Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072067 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2013 | 21 Pages |
Abstract
⺠We model coordination games with strategic complements or substitutes in networks. ⺠We examine equilibrium configurations for players with different identities; preferences over the available actions. ⺠We characterize equilibrium networks with complete information (Nash) and incomplete information (Bayesian-Nash). ⺠There is an equilibrium where both actions coexist in the network if the distribution of identities is heterogeneous. ⺠There is a monotonic result where players choose the same if the majority of players has the same identity.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Penélope Hernández, Manuel Muñoz-Herrera, Ángel Sánchez,