Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072085 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2012 | 15 Pages |
Abstract
In this paper we use a laboratory setting to manipulate our subjectsʼ beliefs about the cognitive levels of the players they are playing against. We show that in the context of the 2/3 guessing game, individual choices crucially depend on their beliefs about the level of others. Hence, a subjectʼs true cognitive level may be different than the one he exhibits in a game with the difference being attributed to his expectations about the sophistication of the players he is playing against.
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Marina Agranov, Elizabeth Potamites, Andrew Schotter, Chloe Tergiman,