| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5072174 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2012 | 23 Pages |
Abstract
⺠Hotelling-Downs model with office-seeking candidates and runoff voting is studied. ⺠It is shown that in this model Nash equilibria in pure strategies always exist. ⺠Both convergent and divergent equilibria are possible. ⺠Two-policy equilibria exist under any distribution of votersʼ ideal policies. ⺠More than two-policy equilibria exist generically under additional conditions.
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Authors
Sandro Brusco, Marcin DziubiÅski, Jaideep Roy,