Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072263 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2013 | 16 Pages |
Abstract
⺠We study contests (between a two-player alliance and a single player) experimentally. ⺠We compare effort choices in inter-alliance contests under peaceful and non-peaceful sharing rules (within the victorious alliances). ⺠We show that in-group solidarity vanishes after the break-up of the alliance. ⺠Former 'brothers in arms' fight even more vigorously (afterwards) against each other than strangers do. ⺠This vigorous internal fighting is anticipated and reduces alliancesʼ ability to mobilize their joint fighting effort.
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Authors
Changxia Ke, Kai A. Konrad, Florian Morath,