| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5072275 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2013 | 14 Pages |
Abstract
⺠We consider cake cutting as a mechanism design problem. ⺠We examine the special case when agents have the same marginal value for all desired intervals. ⺠We give a direct-revelation mechanism that is dominant strategy incentive compatible, Pareto-efficient, proportional, envy-free, and computationally tractable. ⺠We consider randomized mechanisms and obtain similar results for more general valuations under a weaker notion of incentive compatibility.
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Authors
Yiling Chen, John K. Lai, David C. Parkes, Ariel D. Procaccia,