Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072418 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2010 | 17 Pages |
Abstract
In this paper we propose minority voting as a scheme that can partially protect individuals from the risk of repeated exploitation. We consider a committee that meets twice to decide about projects including a first-period project that may have long-lasting impact. In the first period, a simple open majority voting scheme takes place. Voting splits the committee into three groups: voting winners, voting losers, and absentees. Under minority voting, only voting losers retain their voting rights in the second period. We show that as soon as absolute risk aversion exceeds a threshold value, minority voting is superior to repeated application of the simple majority rule.
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Theresa Fahrenberger, Hans Gersbach,