Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072423 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2010 | 14 Pages |
Abstract
Motivated by the extensive evidence about the relevance of status quo bias both in experiments and in real markets, we study this phenomenon from a decision-theoretic prospective, focusing on the case of preferences under uncertainty. We develop an axiomatic framework that takes as a primitive the preferences of an agent for each possible status quo option, and provide a characterization according to which the agent considers a full-dimensional set of possible priors and abandons her status quo option only if she finds an alternative that returns a higher expected utility for each of these priors. We then show that, in this framework, the very presence of a status quo induces the agent to be more uncertainty averse than she would be without a status quo option.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Pietro Ortoleva,