Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072444 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2010 | 18 Pages |
Abstract
We show that when firms have incomplete information about the market demand and their costs, a (Bayesian) Cournot equilibrium in pure strategies may not exist, or be unique. In fact, we are able to construct surprisingly simple and robust examples of duopolies with these features. However, we also find some sufficient conditions for existence, and for uniqueness, of Cournot equilibrium in a certain class of industries. More general results arise when negative prices are possible.
Related Topics
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Ezra Einy, Ori Haimanko, Diego Moreno, Benyamin Shitovitz,