Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072651 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2007 | 22 Pages |
Abstract
A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot determine the payoffs of those coalitions that are not involved in the deviation. Each game generates a unique minimal (for inclusion) dominant set. This minimal dominant set is non-empty and returns the coalition structure core in case this core is non-empty. We provide an algorithm to find the minimal dominant set.
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Authors
László Á. Kóczy, Luc Lauwers,