| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5072687 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2009 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
We introduce the aggregate-monotonic core as the set of allocations of a transferable utility cooperative game attainable by single-valued solutions that satisfy core-selection and aggregate-monotonicity. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core and the aggregate-monotonic core. Finally, we introduce upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity for set-valued solutions, and characterize the aggregate-monotonic core using core-selection and upper and lower aggregate-monotonicity.
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Authors
Pedro Calleja, Carles Rafels, Stef Tijs,