Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072739 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2009 | 13 Pages |
Abstract
A consistency condition (action-consistency) on the interim beliefs of players in a game is introduced. Action-consistency is weaker than common priors and, unlike common priors, is characterized by a “no-bets” condition on verifiable events. Using action-consistency, we provide epistemic conditions to Nash and correlated equilibria weakening the common knowledge restrictions in Aumann and Brandenburger [Aumann, R., Brandenburger, A., 1995. Epistemic conditions for Nash equilibrium. Econometrica 63, 1161-1180] and Aumann [Aumann, R., 1987. Correlated equilibrium as an expression of Bayesian rationality. Econometrica 55, 1-18].
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Authors
Paulo Barelli,