Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5072757 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2009 | 12 Pages |
Abstract
If a TU game is extendable, then its core is a stable set. However, there are many TU games with a stable core that are not extendable. A coalition is vital if there exists some core element x such that none of the proper subcoalitions is effective for x. It is exact if it is effective for some core element. If all coalitions that are vital and exact are extendable, then the game has a stable core. It is shown that the contrary is also valid for matching games, for simple flow games, and for minimum coloring games.
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Evan Shellshear, Peter Sudhölter,