Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5073033 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2006 | 18 Pages |
Abstract
This paper studies coalition formation, payoff division and expected payoffs in a “divide the dollar by majority rule” game with random proposers. A power index is called self-confirming if it can be obtained as an equilibrium of the game using the index itself as probability vector. Unlike the Shapley value and other commonly used power indices, the nucleolus has this property. The proof uses a weak version of Kohlberg's [SIAM J. Appl. Math. 20 (1971) 62] balancedness result reinterpreting the balancing weights as probabilities in a mixed strategy equilibrium.
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Authors
Maria Montero,