| Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 5073036 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2006 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
Following Mongin [J. Econ. Theory 66 (1995) 313; J. Math. Econ. 29 (1998) 331], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 are incompatible with the strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided.
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Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Christopher P. Chambers, Takashi Hayashi,