Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5073124 | Games and Economic Behavior | 2006 | 18 Pages |
Abstract
We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria in pure strategies (NE), even if the strategy sets are not convex; and that various dynamic processes converge to NE. In particular, NE exist in Cournot oligopoly with indivisibilities in production.Our notion of aggregation is quite general and enables us to take a unified view of several disparate models.
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Authors
Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko, Andriy Zapechelnyuk,