Allocation of risks and equilibrium in markets with finitely many traders

The optimal risk allocation problem, equivalently the optimal risk sharing problem, in a market with n traders endowed with risk measures ϱ1,…,ϱn is a classical problem in insurance and mathematical finance. This problem however only makes sense under a condition motivated from game theory which is called Pareto equilibrium. There are many situations of practical interest, where this condition does not hold. This is the case if the risk measures are based on essential different views towards risk. In this paper we introduce and analyze a meaningful extension of the optimal risk allocation (risk sharing) problem without assuming the equilibrium condition. The main point of this is to introduce a suitable and well motivated restriction on the class of admissible allocations which prevents effects of artificial 'risk arbitrage'. As a result we obtain a new coherent risk measure which describes the inherent risk which remains after using admissible risk exchange in an optimal way.