Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5077784 | International Journal of Industrial Organization | 2017 | 20 Pages |
Abstract
Spectrum auction design has seen number innovations in the recent years. Regulators have used various types of combinatorial auction formats including simple ascending combinatorial clock auctions and first-price sealed-bid combinatorial auctions. The Simultaneous Multi-Round Auction (SMRA) and the two-stage Combinatorial Clock Auction (CCA) are the most wide-spread auction formats for spectrum sales to date. We provide an accessible overview of strategic problems in these auction formats and summarize research challenges in this field for a broader audience of readers in industrial organization.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Martin Bichler, Jacob K. Goeree,