Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078337 | International Journal of Industrial Organization | 2009 | 7 Pages |
Abstract
A monopoly facing potential entry may not want to develop an efficient technology even at zero R&D costs. Such a phenomenon occurs if a new technology is distinct from the existing one so production uncertainty becomes technology-specific. Then the monopoly can reduce the entrant's post-entry profit to the point of deterrence by using the existing technology with which the entrant would enter. We show that the monopoly develops a new technology when the entrant faces a sufficiently high or low entry cost but forgoes invention when the entry cost is intermediate. These results hold both in quantity and price competition.
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Authors
Anthony Creane, Kaz Miyagiwa,