Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5078501 | International Journal of Industrial Organization | 2006 | 29 Pages |
Abstract
The article presents a novel meta-regression analysis of the size of cartel overcharges from a sample of more than 800 observations collected from a wide variety of published sources. The analysis of a subsample of 395 cartel episodes finds that duration, legal environment, and organizational characteristics of cartels explain variation in overcharge rates to a greater extent than the type of publication or the method of calculation. Overcharges tend to be significantly higher for durable international cartels. Secular decline is observed as antitrust-enforcement regimes have stiffened.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
John M. Connor, Yuliya Bolotova,