Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5083272 | International Review of Economics & Finance | 2016 | 50 Pages |
Abstract
Mainland Chinese government employs two related strategies to protect its national and economic interests in the process of financial liberalization. It grants government protection to industries of national interest. In addition, it also maintains political-linkage with certain firms to assert their influence. We term these firms as strategic firms. We argue these strategic firms with economic and national interests demonstrate better performance and higher management turnovers. Management turnovers are less frequent if the chairpersons and CEOs are politically-connected. The strategic firms also rebound better from financial distress than non-strategic firms.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Louis T.W. Cheng, T.Y. Leung,