Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5083402 | International Review of Economics & Finance | 2014 | 17 Pages |
This study examines the determinants of board structure for Taiwanese firms by reviewing their board elections, held between 1991 and 2009. The paper emphasizes three factors: the distinction between insider-affiliated and non-insider-affiliated outside directors based on family relationships, governmental agency theory-based regulations, and the firm's choice between agency and stewardship governance philosophy. Evidence has shown that the proportion of non-insider-affiliated outsiders on the board is sensitive to changes in firm and CEO characteristics, and to changes in government regulations. Government regulations significantly shape corporate boards, encouraging a smaller size, more outside directors, and fewer insider-affiliated outside directors. For firms adopting agency and stewardship theories as governance arrangement, the determinants of board structure are diverse. The board structure of principal-steward firms is less susceptible to changes in firm characteristics but more susceptible to CEO influence, and more responsive to government regulations.