Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5083677 | International Review of Economics & Finance | 2014 | 11 Pages |
Abstract
We show the effects of product differentiation and product market competition on technology licensing by an outside innovator. For a certain range of product differentiation, both the innovator and the society prefer royalty licensing compared to auction (or fixed-fee), irrespective of Cournot and Bertrand competitions, if the number of potential licensees is sufficiently large. Hence, for such a range of product differentiation, neither the innovator nor the antitrust authority requires information about the type of product market competition in choosing the type of the licensing contract.
Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities
Economics, Econometrics and Finance
Economics and Econometrics
Authors
Aniruddha Bagchi, Arijit Mukherjee,