Article ID | Journal | Published Year | Pages | File Type |
---|---|---|---|---|
5084592 | International Review of Financial Analysis | 2016 | 14 Pages |
Abstract
We find that UK firms are increasingly having fewer board meetings mainly because of the significant increase in the proportion of foreign non-executive directors on the board. The combination of low meeting frequency and the presence of foreign non-executive directors is correlated with lower total shareholder returns and increases the agency conflicts through excess compensation of the CEO and chairman, which are not related to firm value creation. Our results suggest that a trade-off between increased board diversity coupled with reduced monitoring through fewer meetings, weakens the internal governance mechanism, reduces the advisory role benefits of foreign non-executive directors who are likely to possess international expertise, and significantly exacerbate agency conflicts.
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Authors
Peter D. Hahn, Meziane Lasfer,