Article ID Journal Published Year Pages File Type
5086228 Japan and the World Economy 2011 12 Pages PDF
Abstract

We show that the optimal inflation target imposed on a discretionary central bank varies with the extent of fiscal decentralization. Our analysis compares two fiscal regimes for local government bond management: the partially decentralized (PD) regime where the central government determines the amount of local bond; and the fully decentralized (FD) regime where each local government determines the amount of local bond. In both regimes, an inflation target has two effects: it harnesses surprise inflation; and it induces excess issuance of local bonds. Due to externality in determining the level of local government bond, however, the second effect, and thereby the optimal level of the inflation target, are smaller in the FD regime than in the PD regime. We also find that even if fiscal decentralization in its isolation deteriorates social welfare, we may be able to improve social welfare by introducing an inflation target when fiscal decentralization measures are adopted.

► Optimal inflation target varies with the extent of fiscal decentralization. ► The target is smaller under full decentralization than under partial decentralization. ► Inflation target may reduce welfare deterioration due to fiscal decentralization.

Related Topics
Social Sciences and Humanities Economics, Econometrics and Finance Economics and Econometrics
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